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Abstract  
 
In this conceptual paper I enter the contested field of the notion of philosophy, which in itself, is an old and complex 
philosophical problem. Philosophers have characterized philosophical reflection by its notorious inconclusiveness. I 
metaphorically situate the conceptions of philosophy as a fertile pasture in which philosophers of different shades contest for a 
defensible meaning of philosophy. I explore four perspectives of philosophy as 1) the worldview or personal attitude, 2) an 
activity or an academic discipline of study, 3) universal or 4) particular /cultural. I attempt to survey and analyse the different 
schools of thought in an effort to provide a balanced view of the notion. 
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Not asking certain questions is pregnant with more dangers than failing to answer the questions already on the official 
agenda; while asking the wrong kind of questions all too often helps avert eyes from the truly important issues. The 
price of silence is paid in the hard currency of human suffering (Bauman, 1998, p. ix). 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The question, what is philosophy, is a reflexive one. It is about philosophy, provoked by philosophers themselves and 
represents an old and complex philosophical problem. Due to the complexity, each time philosophers attempt to discover 
what it is, they inevitably emerge with a new way of dealing with it, which is actually one way of doing philosophy. As a 
result, philosophy itself has traditionally been a considerable controversy. In effect, philosophy “is its own first problem” 
(Lucas, 1969, p. 1) and there is no other discipline that continues to question itself the way philosophy does. One of the 
central questions is: Is philosophy a body of knowledge? Whatever it is, there are several questions that emanate from 
this. Divergent views as to what philosophy is, what it offers man and what it aspires to do dominate all debates that are 
said to be philosophical. The philosophy question is therefore a vexing philosophical issue that resists every attempt to 
answer it in a definitive manner. Philosophical reflections are notorious for their inconclusiveness. However, philosophy 
can also be approached from different viewpoints. 
Perhaps the question “what is philosophy” could be resolved by engaging ourselves in a family of questions, 
including: 
• What activity is properly referred to as philosophising?  
• What sort of a person is actually called a philosopher? 
• What sort of tradition is properly called a tradition of philosophising? 
• Can a thought system be justifiably called a philosophy or a philosophical system? 
In addition to the above questions that seek to define the boundaries of what fits into the scope of philosophy, Janz 
(2004) questions the role of place as a criterion of philosophy. He asks: 
• Is philosophical thought unaffected by the place in which it is practised? 
• Can philosophy be conducted “in place”? 
• Are there inhospitable places for philosophy...? (for example) a refugee or concentration camp? 
• Is philosophy appropriate to all places? (and) 
• Can philosophy attend to a place and still remain philosophical (p. 104)? 
In the context of this paper, each approach will be considered as a supplement of the other and not as its 
contradiction and, as such, each will assist in making clear the diversity in meaning of philosophy and what different 
philosophers may say about the nature and function of philosophy. An attempt will be made to explore the meaning of 
philosophy. In order to do this, the three functions of philosophy, that is, the normative, the descriptive and the analytic 
will be explored. Also to be examined is the controversy surrounding philosophy as universal or cultural/particular 
practice. Given the brief charaterisation of the concept of philosophy, I hope to explore in this paper the nature and aim of 
philosophy before considering the two main conceptions of philosophy, that is, 1) philosophy as a worldview or personal 
attitude 2) philosophy as an activity and philosophy as an academic discipline of study.  
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2. The Nature and Character of Philosophy 
 
Philosophy itself suggests an array of theoretical approaches (Blackburn, 2004). Some essentialist thinkers acknowledge 
that great scholarly works such as Plato’s Republic orDescartes’ Meditations count as philosophy, who by laying down a 
definition, create a permanent and universal conception so that whatever lies within is philosophy and what is without is 
not. Others who hold on to the academic definition believe that philosophy is whatever is produced by people paid as 
philosophers in university faculties. The extreme approach is one that proposes that any text that gets read as philosophy 
counts as philosophy. In a way, the latter approach submits to the conviction that philosophy lies in the eye of the 
beholder. I find the latter problematic in that no two philosophers will agree on either the nature or status of philosophy 
that borders the definition. In support of the above, Anyanwu has put forward the position that those who seek to 
determine what philosophy is with one and only definition, are misguided. Thus he writes: 
Most people who ask about the definition of philosophy find out that different philosophers give different definitions of it, 
and that such definitions are conflicting and contradictory. The innumerable definitions…seem to betray the preferences 
of each philosopher and to show the impossibility of offering a simple definition…or having one philosophy acceptable to 
all men, in all cultures and at all times… (Anyanwu, 2000, p. 126). 
The significant character that is explicit in the above quotation is the elusiveness of the definition. Besides, 
Anyanwu observes that the enterprise of philosophy is characterised by the inconclusiveness of philosophical issues and 
reflections. Without a specific subject matter and therefore lacking a particular area of investigation, philosophy makes it 
difficult to tie itself to any exclusive and specific sphere. Hence, it is a philosophical problem to show outright distinctions 
between philosophical and non-philosophical discourses. Due to the numerous complexities of the notion, philosophy has 
come to be misunderstood by many. This could be attributed to wide misconception about its nature, purpose, methods, 
and relevance to public affairs in particular and human purposes in general.  
Philosophy is not a fixed body of knowledge but is rather a continuous, ongoing reflective process as will be 
defended in the later parts of this paper. In addition, philosophy is dynamic and not static and changes with time in terms 
of its content and character. While the past has often defined philosophy in terms of wisdom, science, analysis, critique 
etc., and has been practised in different locales, for example the market place, churches and universities, this historical 
dimension is overtaken by the definition of philosophy as a mental activity. Yes, we might find it difficult to define 
philosophy by referring to its nature but we can understand the nature of philosophy by referring to it as an attitude of the 
mind, its source and its aim.  
The etymological meaning of philosophy, derived from the Greek composite philosophia, is the ‘love of wisdom’. 
Love is named initially to underscore a craving and striving to accomplish wisdom. This involves the passion to begin and 
sustain questioning things that are taken for granted. Thus, the continued quest for knowledge; its passionate search, and 
not its possession, is the essence of wisdom. As a result, philosophy becomes an inquisitive attitude of the mind. 
Philosophy thus is cognitive and conceptual since its content involves “…the exploration of the most basic ideas and 
problems of everyday life…” and is meta-cognitive in content since the process is about “improving one’s own thinking 
and reasoning…” (Fisher, 1996, p. 1). But the question is: What is the source of philosophy? Do all people, of different 
races and ages, develop an inquisitive attitude?  
The initial source of philosophical questioning is the sense of wonder — a sort of childlike wonder about just about 
everything. Even among the ancient philosophers from Socrates, Plato to Aristotle there is consensus that wonder, 
puzzlement, astonishment and amazement mark the starting point of philosophy. Plato puts the following words in 
Socrates as he writes,” I see, my dear Theaetetus, that Theodorus had a true insight into your nature when he said that 
you were a philosopher, for wonder is the feeling of a philosopher, and philosophy begins in wonder” (Plato, 155d, p. 37). 
Aristotle echoes the Theaetetus in Metaphysics: “It was their wonder, astonishment that first led men to philosophise and 
still leads them (Aristotle, 982b ). For Plato, wonder refers to curiosity, to questioning and to seeking an answer to the 
questions raised by life. Doubt as a condition between belief and disbelief, involves indecision or mistrust of a supposed 
truth, an action, a motive, or a decision. Wonder involves the state of being curious and being in doubt. When we start to 
doubt that we do not fully understand and have not fully justified our basic beliefs about the world, we begin to 
philosophise. In this sense wonder, doubt and philosophy are connected, with wonder being a necessary condition for 
philosophy. In reiterating the role of “wonder” in the activity of philosophy, Omoregbe (1998) observes the following: 
…the first step in the philosophical activity is this “wonder” that accompanies man’s contact with himself or the world 
around him. This wonder gives rise to some fundamental questions and this is the second step. The third step is taken 
when man begins to reflect on these fundamental questions in search of answers. At this stage, the man in question is 
philosophising… (p. 3). 
Amazement and bewilderment form the basis on which philosophers devise and formulate the what and why 
questions in a bid to have comprehension of the problem at hand. Questions are the first instrument in the philosopher’s 
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arsenal with which he or she works. It is out of the workings of an inquiring mind that philosophy emerges. It also 
becomes known out of human intellectual curiosity to transcend common sense. Philosophy, as Russell (2005) puts it 
“…keeps alive our sense of wonder by showing familiar things in an unfamiliar aspect” (p. 37). However, if everything on 
which philosophy lays a hand changes its nature from known to unknown, then what does philosophy aim for? 
Philosophy aims at understanding and enlightenment rather than providing short conclusive answers. While 
searching for truth, philosophy does not close out new evidence but rather the search is perpetual striving for new 
insights. When comparing philosophical inquiry and scientific inquiry, one observes that the latter seeks knowledge that 
provides specific answers while the former enters by searching for answers on the residual questions that the former has 
failed to address. However, both attempt to provide answers, though science will end at a point where empirical evidence 
provides the answers while philosophy will theorise about the general implications of the evidence. The central concern of 
philosophy is to attend to insoluble questions for example, “what is life?” “Does reality exist?” “What is to know?” If the 
central concern of philosophy is the pursuit of questions that scientific inquiry has to answer then the empirical world 
would query the excitement of the enterprise of philosophy? If it is so complex, abstract and mentally unsettling, is it 
suitable for everyone, including children? I argue that philosophy increases our understanding of the problem at hand. It 
is by remaining curious and asking questions about the commonplace and the assumed knowledge that we keep 
theoretical knowledge alive. Philosophy as a critical activity of the mind comes alive regardless of its non-committal to 
provide definitive answers. The above characterisation provides the goal of philosophy as the enlargement of self-
contemplation of the infinity of the universe – what Russell (2005) calls “contemplative vision or speculation”. 
Nevertheless, if this is what a philosophical activity involves, then do all people philosophise, including children? In the 
next section, I discuss the two conceptions of the notion of philosophy, namely the worldview conception and the process 
view of it. 
 
3. Conceptions of Philosophy 
 
As discussed in the section above, to do philosophy is to ask questions of a special kind about central human problems 
and then to grapple with them in a rigorous and meticulous way. Some conceive philosophy as a worldview; “…an 
accumulation of contents or products” (Estarellas, 2007 n.p.), and others an activity or a process — what Pecorino (1985) 
refers to as the “process view”(p .80). The nature and character of each will be explored in the sections below coupled 
with their critique. 
 
3.1 The worldview conception of philosophy 
 
The popular saying that “each of us has a philosophy” and “my philosophy is…” reflects the conception of philosophy as a 
worldview. Such a definition suggests “worldview” as a general view of the world. But the appearance of the word does 
not disclose the full meaning of this intricate intellectual phenomenon (Spirkin, 1983). Generally, we can say all people 
think and thinking is the passageway that leads to philosophy. This argument has led people to reasonably conclude that 
everyone has the potential of becoming a philosopher. Besides, proponents of this view hold that since we all experience 
life, we think and reflect on the challenges of life and therefore we develop our individual philosophies of life. Frost (1962) 
explains the above perspective as he writes: 
Your philosophy, then, is the meaning which the world has for you. It is your answer to the question, “why?” having fitted 
your experiences into the whole, having related them to each other, you say of the world, this is the way things fit 
together. This is the world as I understand it. This is my philosophy (p.1). 
The above is often referred to as the common-sense view of philosophy. It is an attempt to define philosophy as a 
collection of views or beliefs one or a group of people have about the world and though often held uncritically. In this 
sense, philosophy is an attitude, a belief or a wish and therefore a product. Based on personal preferences, the worldview 
conception holds that individuals or a group of people can select a body of thought that they can call theirs. Thus 
worldview is a system of generalised views of the world, including man’s place in it; a view of man’s relationship to the 
world and himself/herself (Spirkin, 1983). Besides posing as an independent existence in the sphere of social 
consciousness, worldview is individual; with individuals forming their identity by defining their views of the world. 
However, noteworthy is the understanding that despite the diversity of worldviews there are, in each worldview, some 
common questions that transcend the particular and therefore are universal in their revelation of a certain unity. For 
instance, what is reality? How do we come to know reality? What is right or wrong?  
To grasp further the understanding of philosophy as worldview, Wolters (1983) explores more the different 
conceptions of the connection between worldview and philosophy. According to the first conception, worldview “repels” 
philosophy in that there is an unavoidable tension that exists between “…theoretical philosophy and existential worldview” 
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(p.15). In other words, the worldview conception does not accommodate philosophy as an activity that challenges and 
resists the existing views and beliefs man hold about their life-world. In the second conception, worldview “crowns” 
philosophy in that “worldview is not alien to philosophy but is instead its highest manifestation” (p. 16). To acknowledge 
this, proponents of this model look at worldviews that an individual has or a people have. Expressed differently, this 
model speaks of worldview as the pinnacle and product of the activity of philosophising; that is, to demonstrate that the 
process of doing philosophy is only evidenced by the end product — the worldview. In this sense, philosophy has a task 
of combining the conclusions of the different sciences with the human experiences to produce some kind of consistent 
worldview.  
According to the third conception, for Wolters (1983), worldview “flanks” philosophy. In other words, this model 
views the two as running parallel and therefore should be kept separate. Thus, it is mandatory not to confuse worldview 
with philosophy and neither should we allow for compromise. To that end, the model holds that we should understand 
worldview and philosophy as separate entities. The opposite view of the second model is the fourth – that worldview 
“yields” philosophy. Put differently, the model looks at philosophy as a product of a worldview and not the opposite. 
Worldview in this sense leads to philosophy; that is, philosophy is an expression of the worldview. Philosophy can only 
take place in the context of worldview(s). In this context, worldview is a group of perennial problems in which people 
develop interest and for which philosophers have always sought answers. This leads to an understanding of the duality 
between philosophy and worldview with the former as the process that not only works on the latter but with the latter 
being a product of the former.  
What then are the implications of this relationship? Is philosophy necessarily a worldview or a worldview 
necessarily philosophy? Or, should the two never be conflated? What I find interesting is the basic idea that both 
philosophy and worldview share a cognitive orientation of viewing the world, although they differ in terms of emphasis. 
While philosophy stresses the universal, abstract and individual nature of viewing, worldview emphasises the specific, 
concrete and unique character of viewing. In this sense, for Wolters (1983), worldview “… represents a point of view from 
a particular vantage point, a perspective on things which cannot transcend its own historicity” (p. 18). Thus, a worldview is 
characterised by being individual, dated and private. However, as indicated earlier on, a worldview may be more than 
personal. If held by everyone belonging to a nation or a people, it is collective. This does not dissolve its particularity, 
since its existence does not go beyond the people or culture from which it originates. Thus, we can talk of the Shona 
worldview, Akan worldview or Sotho worldview, and none of these worldviews can claim their existence in others. In 
addition, the worldview is more related to the practices specific to a people and it functions within it. In the process, it 
misses the theoretical component. Thus, it is often considered unscientific unlike philosophy, which, by its theoretical 
nature, is not particular to culture alone but rather transcends cultures and individuals, thereby giving it a universal 
character. The question then is: Is it plausible to talk of A’s philosophy as A’s worldview? I argue that when referring to 
A’s individual thoughts about the individual’s unique, permanent and particular world, we are referring to the individual’s 
worldview. In this sense, worldview is equated to philosophy since it is a way of viewing man and the world that results in 
a world outlook in the first place. Making much the same point, Wiredu (1992) writes that, “Any group of human beings 
will have to have some world outlook, that is, some general conceptions about the world in which they live and about 
themselves both as individuals and members of society” (p. 40).  
Nevertheless, unless these views are subjected to the process of rigorous, systematic analysis for them to adopt a 
more theoretical and universal understanding of the world they remain worldview apart from philosophy. They remain a 
body of ideas, doctrines and beliefs held by an individual and a people and fixed in the context in which they originated. 
Conversely, can we rightly speak of African philosophy, British philosophy, or Asian when referring to the customs, 
traditions, ideas and beliefs held by the Africans, British, and Asians, respectively, in their own geographical 
backgrounds? Are a people’s egocentric and unexamined habits of mind classified as “philosophy” or are they simply 
unarticulated and unsynthesised beliefs disposed to vagueness and contradiction?  
From the arguments raised in this section, I would argue that it is a misconception to refer to them as philosophy; 
they are, rather, worldviews. Misconceptions about the nature and character of philosophy may be attributed to 
widespread ignorance of what philosophy has achieved through works of great philosophers. Those who are skeptical 
about the value of philosophy have not bothered to know its subject matter, how it is pursued and what its capabilities 
are. I now turn to the other conception of philosophy — philosophy as a process.  
 
3.2 The process conception of philosophy 
 
The discussion above has exposed the complexity of defining the nature of philosophy. The process view which I will 
explore in this section looks at philosophy as an activity, “…an activity of thought, an activity of critical and comprehensive 
thought... an activity which responds to society’s demand for wisdom…bringing together all that we know in order to 
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obtain what we value...” (Pecorino, 1985). Taken from the position of philosophy as critical and comprehensive thought it 
implies that the process conception of philosophy involves, among other things: 
• Resolving confusion 
• Unmasking assumptions 
• Testing positions 
• Correcting distortions 
• Looking for reasons 
• Questioning conceptual frameworks 
• Broadening experience and dispelling ignorance 
• Exploring values 
• Fixing beliefs by rational inquiry 
• Questing for wisdom (Pecorino, 1985).  
To do the above involves asking questions of a special kind about fundamental human problems and then to 
grapple with them in a precise and accurate way. Philosophising thus involves the articulation and enunciation of some 
unspoken knowledge; implicit and inferred in human experience. This demands time and a certain level of mental 
development of the individual. But, the question is: Can all people, including children, meet the demands of 
philosophising? I argue that not all persons are given to the process of philosophising. Philosophy, in the above 
categorisation, is not to be confused with its end product. For instance, it is not the questions and issues that define 
philosophy. Rather, it is the way in which they are dealt with or thought about. It is more about the method of doing 
philosophy, which, like most activities, requires practice to excel at it. Unlike the worldview conception discussed in the 
previous section that pays special attention to the historical production of philosophic thoughts, philosophy as a process 
returns to the Socratic marketplace where the method of inquiry and skill of reasoning are most demanded.  
Similarly, Nagel (1987) argues “…the common concern of philosophy is to question and understand very common 
ideas that all of us use every day without thinking about them” (p. 5). Philosophy will raise fundamental and profound 
questions about experience so as to explore its meaning and construct from it a coherent approximation of ultimate truth. 
While philosophy asks questions and offers answers, it does not provide answers which wipe out the initial questions. 
Instead, it allows us to live with them rationally. While philosophical answers do not solve questions about the existential 
situation, they assist us in transforming and broadening our own personal view of the world. In justifying the inquisitive 
character of human being, Savater (2002)has come to the conclusion that “For what is man if not an animal that asks 
questions and will go on asking them, even after all imaginable answers have been given”(p. 7). The question then is if all 
human beings have a proclivity to question reality, are all questions that they ask philosophical. The philosophical 
questions will remain contestable and insoluble. So, are children capable of asking philosophical questions; ask questions 
and find answers through critical and rigorous reflection? This leads me to distinguish the process view of philosophy 
from most academic disciplines, as demonstrated in its two discernible manifestations: the professional practice of 
philosophical inquiry, and the amateur practice of philosophical inquiry. 
The professional practice of philosophy, which sometimes is referred to as academic philosophy, involves not only 
grappling with philosophical questions from scratch but accommodates analysing the solutions past philosophers have 
given to the challenges of their time. For instance, a professional philosopher will attend to some assumptions, beliefs, 
and doctrines and thoughts that have been handled by thinkers in their tradition or even in traditions that transcend their 
cultures. For instance, a professional philosopher will subject any thoughts and beliefs to critical scrutiny through 
rigorous, systematic argumentation. On this view, philosophy becomes a critical, rigorous, systematic and consistent 
method of engaging with previously held “knowledge”. Such a perspective of philosophy is usually the dominant one and 
the most prestigious one practised in universities and colleges. As Estarellas (2007) puts it, “…in the contemporary world, 
philosophy as a practice enjoys great health, at least within the boundaries of universities” (n. p.) and this enables it 
(philosophy) to exist as a relatively free activity. This professional philosophy view has often been criticised for growing 
apart from life coupled with its increasingly abstract interests away from societal problems. This is despite academic 
philosophers continuing to produce easily defensible and practically relevant works that draw the attention of a wide 
readership. Non-philosophers have often accused philosophy of being a perfect example of ivory towerism and 
irrelevance due to its “…preoccupation with abstract theoretical concerns, with elitism, a priorism, and uninvolvement in 
the practical affairs of life” (Gyekye, 1997, p. 3); what Onyewuenyi (1991) refers to as “an academic and dehumanised 
philosophy… highly abstract, lifeless and artificial, emptied of real content… (where) thinking overshadowed existence” 
(p. 35). In addition, philosophy as a discipline is often criticised for being an exclusive intellectual activity that only excites 
intellectual well-being of its practitioners.  
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While a philosopher, generally, maybe concerned with facts and practices of life, the professional philosopher 
operates at a rarefied and abstract level. In addition, nearly all philosophers hold their philosophies as joint works with 
those who initially inspired or provoked them. On such an account, a genuine philosophical investigation is touched off by 
puzzlement at the enunciations of other philosophies and philosophers. Most of the philosophers come to see new ideas 
or style of philosophy only because of reacting to the thoughts or products of some other past or contemporary thinkers or 
persons. To this end, Singer (1995) uses the methodological perspective to define philosophy as, “…a method of 
enquiring into very fundamental questions that do not yield to the methods of science…this method can be characterised 
by a form of relentless questioning, in which the answer to one question only leads to a further question, and so on, and 
on and on” (pp. 1-12). 
The model that locates the raw material of philosophy directly in the world and the relations human beings have 
with their world is sometimes referred to as amateur philosophy: an antonym to the professional model. The model posits 
the activity of philosophising as being engaged in without necessarily having to refer to the canon of philosophical ideas 
already existing and crucially, too, without being employed as a philosopher. On this view, Savater (2002) proposes that 
philosophy is “... an intellectual exercise, not a collection of witty remarks…(or) a catalogue of celebrated views” (p. xii). 
Nor is it simply repetition of other people’s thoughts. Hence, the conclusion that if philosophy is to be studied, it should 
not only be for the sake of any definite answers to its questions but for the sake of the questions themselves as well 
(Russell, 1998 ). Questions expand our conception of what is possible, augment our intellectual imagination and reduce 
the dogmatic assurance which closes the mind against speculation(Russell, 1998 ). However, this position does not deny 
that philosophers may consciously use others’ ideas to support their own. 
The above description is an attempt to define philosophy in terms of “doing”. However, it is noteworthy to observe 
that this formal way of doing philosophy acknowledges that we cannot treat “having” a philosophy and “doing” philosophy 
as independent of each other. I argue that if there was no philosophy (or bluntly worldview) in the personal sense then 
there would be nothing on which we can employ criticism and reflection, that is, do philosophy. Hence, worldviews are not 
philosophies. Rather, a philosophical attitude is characterised by tolerance of other views, criticism, inquisitiveness and 
open-mindedness in search of meaning. While common sense presents the raw material, philosophy is the reflective and 
critical activity of the mental faculty in processing the availed material. The activity of philosophy is individual in the sense 
that no two people can philosophise for each other but rather can do philosophy with each other; for example, by entering 
in a dialogical engagement. But the common denominator between the two dimensions of the process view is the 
understanding that philosophy is more of an activity that utilises unique skills and methods of thinking to provide practical 
advice for living (Morris, 1999) with reflection as the most outstanding method of doing philosophy.  
Given the two definitions of the process view of philosophy, that is, philosophy as doing, what implications for 
education can we draw from them? Academic (professional) philosophy is usually the didactic philosophy taught in 
universities and colleges in which students learn and interpret texts written by great thinkers — past or present. If well 
executed, this didactic philosophy view does help users to recognise what others have written about philosophical 
problems at the expense of involving themselves in the engagement of the problems on their own. Hence, Schopenhauer 
(1985) has observed that: 
The man who thinks for himself becomes acquainted with the authorities for his opinions only after he has acquired 
them and merely as a confirmation of them, while a book philosopher starts with his authorities, in that he constructs his 
opinions by collecting together the opinions of others; his mind then compares with that of the former as an automaton 
compares with a living man…This is what determines the difference between a thinker and a mere scholar (p. 91). 
This stresses the value philosophy has not only for adults but for younger members of society, that is, children. 
As a reaction to the professional perspective of philosophy in schools, the amateur philosophical view draws on the 
Socratic dialectic originating from Socrates’ engagement in argumentation in a persistent and unrelenting analysis of any 
subject. This position of philosophy explains philosophy not as revealed knowledge by someone who knows everything to 
someone who knows nothing but rather occurs in an environment of mutuality in which participants “…become 
accomplices in their mutual submission to the forces of reasons and their mutual rejection of the reasons of 
force”(Savater, 2002). This is a form of disciplined conversation in which the most commonly accepted position is 
exposed to a dialogical process with the outcome being a clearer position of the meaning. Of most significance is 
development of thought through the interplay of ideas. Thus, this perspective of philosophy is the comprehensive pursuit 
of an issue with sound reasoning and courage to question the conventional. In view of this, philosophy then becomes a 
dialogical inquiry in which participants not merely accept the views of others but listen and respond to what others think in 
order to live an examined life. Philosophy in this context is a communal dialogical inquiry facilitated by questioning in 
search of meaning.  
Philosophy may also be considered as a personal attitude toward life and the universe. Such an attitude, it may be 
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argued, makes one look at human conditions and their problems in their broad perspective or as part of a larger scheme 
of things. This thereby characterises a philosopher as someone who faces a state of affairs with composure and 
reflection, with poise and composure (Titus, 1997). A mature philosophical attitude involves a searching and critical 
attitude, the open- minded attitude that is expressively demonstrated in the willingness to consider all sides of the matter 
at hand. It includes a readiness to acknowledge life and the world as they are and to challenge them in all their 
relationships. In this sense then, philosophising as an activity is not merely about reading and knowing about great 
philosophical works but about thinking philosophically. Philosophy categorised in this way begins in a wonder, doubt and 
curiosity and grows out of our developing an awareness of human existential circumstances and the accompanying 
challenges. Hence, philosophy takes the form of a speculative attitude that does not diminish when faced with the difficult 
and unresolved human problems. In short, philosophy is analytical and speculative in that it is fundamentally a critical and 
systematic inquiry into the basic ideas and values that underlie human thought, behaviour and practices. In terms of 
method, Koka (1998)points out that philosophy “interrogates, analyses and categorises concepts, testing their validity and 
‘sanity’ in their representation of human life” (p. 26). In addition, Lawson (2004) proposes that philosophy is an “attempt to 
say the unsayable” (p. 274) by asking questions, drawing attention to flaws in conventional opinion and seeking to apply 
rational thought to any argument or claim. In the process of interrogation, analysis and categorisation what is illuminated 
is that philosophical concepts are universal and eternal and they are neither ethnic nor local. This implies that 
philosophical concepts in essence never change except only in interpretation and application. 
Philosophy, for the Greeks, was a practice of asking questions and finding solutions to problems that are valuable 
and worth of satisfaction. In general this ‘love of wisdom’ refers to the tradition of thought which examines the ultimate 
nature of reality, the general conditions of knowing and good society, the existence of beauty and values and the nature 
of humanity (Juuso, 2007). In the days when Socrates discussed issues in the marketplace, philosophy was primarily 
about providing practical guidance for living. Despite the world’s great wisdom tradition having evolved into a variety of 
discourse communities, the central interest of philosophy from pre-Socratic times —how to think critically — remains 
penetrating and meaningful (Solomon, 2000).  
The philosophical method is reflective and critical and therefore involves the attempt to think through one’s 
problems and to face the challenges posed by the universe. Although it might prescribe a rationally reflective way of life, 
philosophy nevertheless does not concern itself with the business of establishing well-filtered and definite doctrines to 
guide people’s lives. It points up alternative courses of action from which individuals can choose. Thus, philosophy has 
the potential to offer more for the life of the individual (young or old) and for human society and public affairs. As implied 
in Plato’s allegory of the cave, philosophers have the duty to return to the cave (the darkness where the majority are) to 
bring enlightenment to the captives in order to save them from ignorance, thereby giving philosophy an instrumental value 
in human affairs. However, for Socrates and Plato alike, philosophy is also an intrinsically valuable activity. The message 
of the allegory characterises clearly that philosophical wisdom and insight should be applied to the practical problems of 
human society.  
 
4. Particular versus Universal Philosophy 
 
As has been noted in the preceding discussion, there are apparent contradictions about what philosophy is, but it may be 
observed that philosophy itself is ambiguous. The main concern of this section is to address Van Hook’s (1993) question 
of whether or not “…philosophy is the product of a universal human reason or is every philosophy in some significant way 
an expression of the culture which produces it? … (p. 36). Bodunrin describes the question of what is to count as 
philosophy as a philosophical question itself (Bodunrin, 1991). However, it must be acknowledged that the particular 
focus of philosophy is on thinking by keeping an eye on the thinking process, that is, it is thinking about thinking. 
Philosophy designates, on the one hand, as Janz (2004) sees it, a collection of reflective thinking procedures founded in 
culture and reason, which rigorously and critically elucidate a life-world. In addition, philosophy is the pursuit to discover 
the implicit assumptions that we operate on; to consider those assumptions critically; and to improve upon those 
assumptions by replacing them with enhanced options. Does the relevance of the ideas, insights, arguments and 
conclusions of philosophers who belong to a particular epoch, culture or societies remain tethered to those times, cultures 
or societies? To answer this question one needs to turn to whether one perceives philosophical ideas or doctrines as 
particular, that is, as relative and relevant only to the times and cultures that conceived them, or as universal, that is as 
going beyond the times and cultures that produced them.  
The particularistic attitude recognises the cultural roots of any philosophical system by arguing that all thought is 
situated in and influenced by its cultural context. One particularist who rejects philosophy as having a universal character 
is Anyanwu(1987), who insisted that “… philosophy is relative to its basic assumption about the nature of experienced 
reality as well as its epistemological attitude or method…And furthermore, different assumptions and models of 
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experienced reality lead to different philosophical doctrines” (p. 237). In the preceding quotation, Anyanwu seems to be 
contradicting himself, especially when he considers the relativity of philosophy. Is this piece of philosophy not particular to 
the agent(s)? If it is also relative then why anyone else ought to be impressed by it? If on the other hand Anyanwu takes it 
to be universal, then he contradicts with himself.  
The tendency to reflect on philosophical questions is part of human nature and it is rooted in man’s natural 
proclivity to know and is informed by the instinct to curiosity. Philosophy is related to culture in the sense in which the 
philosopher looks at the world from the standpoint of the beliefs and conditions of his life, including those of his people 
and culture. In addition, Osuagwu (2005) citing Okere’s Trilogy of African Philosophy describes the relationship between 
philosophy and culture and views culture as “the necessary background, ingredient, raw material, vessel, source, 
nourishment of philosophy” (p. 15). However, cultural particulars are not exclusive of the non-culturally determined criteria 
(Sogolo, 1993). There are universally shared sets of criteria that are common core to human thought and practice. 
Given that philosophy is embroidered by a variety of experiences of different cultures, a variety of philosophical 
assumptions emerge from the complex universe. It is from the diverse world of cultures that philosophical questions 
surface. Questions about human suffering, death, the meaning of human life, for instance, will come to human thought 
after the suffering, pain and death of a relative or friend. This implies that particular lived experiences can invoke 
questions of universal philosophical concern. As Odera Oruka (1989) argues: 
That philosophy is universal does not mean that all the philosophers must have similar methods in philosophy, neither 
does it mean that all rationally warrantable or objectively granted principles or methods must be identical or that they 
must establish similar truths. Two separate philosophical methods, both being rational, can be opposed to each other. 
Similarly, two methods of philosophical inquiry, both using rationally granted and warrantable principles, can come to 
dissimilar truths (p.134).  
Worth noting here is that the themes dealt with in philosophy are universal. How the different cultures trace, 
interpret and synthesise, and in the end put order and meaning to these themes will differ from culture to culture. On this 
view, Onyewuenyi concludes, “No culture has the order or the last word” (Onyewuenyi, 1991, p. 38). If what we have said 
is acceptable, it is possible to talk of a philosophy in a particular context, for example European Philosophy, Asian 
Philosophy or African Philosophy. This implies that each context has its own way of establishing order. Hence Hegel 
came to the conclusion that: 
“Human beings do not, in certain epochs, merely philosophise in general but there is a definite philosophy which arises 
among a people and a definite character which filters through the history of the people, is most intimately related to 
them, thereby constituting their foundation”(Hegel, 1892-1896n.p.).  
While there is the difference of approach between one group of philosophers seeing philosophy in terms of its 
special method and the other in terms of the themes and topics it deals with (content), they are united in the belief that 
philosophy has an important intellectual purpose in the context of present-day society.  
The universalistic view holds that philosophy everywhere shares certain features, concerns and characteristics. 
This point is underlined by Bodunrin (1991) who holds that “philosophy must have the same meaning in all cultures 
although the subjects that receive priority and perhaps the method of dealing with them may be dictated by cultural 
biases and the existential situation within which the philosophers operate”(p. 64-65). The universalistic thesis thus 
maintains that the relevance of philosophical ideas and thoughts can transcend the limits of the times and places of their 
authors that produced them. This could be justified by the fact that, irrespective of their cultures and histories, human 
beings share certain basic values. Values such as friendship, happiness, respect for human life and avoidance of painful 
experiences are good examples. Although not all human beings may share human experiences or problems, the 
fundamental everyday goals of humanity can be said to be held, ultimately, in common by all. Consequently, irrespective 
of people’s cultural backgrounds, they are bound to be interested in engaging in philosophical inquiry into such values. 
Gyekye concludes that:  
… the historical-cultural moorings of philosophical ideas and proposals are sufficient evidence of their particularity and 
of the inappropriateness of applying them universally to other cultures or societies, that those ideas—and the problems 
that gave rise to them—derive from experiences that are specific to cultures or historical situations, and that, 
consequently, philosophers unavoidably focus attention on issues and problems that interest them or relate to the 
experiences of their particular cultures and histories, unconcerned seriously to engage reflectively on the problems and 
issues of other peoples and cultures (Gyekye, 1997, p. 28) 
In sum, any philosophy of a particular culture, like all philosophies produced elsewhere, is characterised by both 
universality and particularity. There are certain universal values such as the sanctity of human life and truth telling and 
likewise culturally dependent priorities. Any philosophy as shown above is concerned with interrogating common values 
irrespective of their places of origin as well as socio-cultural experiences peculiar to a people. 
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5. Conclusion 
 
As has been observed in the discussion above, the question, “what is philosophy?” is itself a philosophical question to 
which a universally acceptable answer is difficult, but not impossible, to find. The portraits of philosophy examined above 
demonstrate that it is easier to do philosophy than discuss it, and to talk about it in some other way than to produce a 
precise, generally agreed definition. However, philosophers engage themselves in the enterprise of philosophising 
whether or not it leads to any consensual conclusions. The definitions of philosophy mainly fall into two broad categories, 
namely philosophy as a technical/academic discipline: philosophy as a process; and philosophy as a worldview — a 
product. The issue of place cuts to the heart of the question of what philosophy is. The above discussion has raised 
issues about the universality or particularity of philosophy thereby leading to perennial contestations among scholars for 
the fertile grassland of meaning of philosophy. 
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